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Abstract
We study the degree of overreaction and the relation of overreaction and psychological biases as
well as financial consequences of overreaction in a controlled experimental setting with 104 partici-
pants. The majority of participants tend to overreact, however, the degree of overreaction is heteroge-
neous. A few subjects even underreact. We also measure the overconfidence of the participants with
a miscalibration scale. In line with theoretical predictions we find that more overconfident subjects
overreact more. We also find that overreaction is associated with higher levels of risk taking after
good signals and lower levels of risk taking after bad signals. Finally, overreaction harms portfolio
efficiency, as measured by the Sharpe ratio.
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1 Introduction
On observing new information, agents should update their beliefs. Rational agents will
do so using Bayes rule. But irrational agents may overreact to the signals they observe.
Such agents, after observing positive news would become exaggeratedly optimistic, and
after bad news exaggeratedly pessimistic. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) offer one of the
first experimental studies of this phenomenon.1
Overreaction can have significant economic effects, especially in financial markets where
information and signal processing are crucial. In this context, it can generate mispricing
and reduce investment performance. Odean (1998) analyzes a model where some investors
think their signal is more accurate than it is really. Consequently, they overreact to their
signals, and market prices also overreact. Daniel et al. (2001) extend the CAPM to the case
of overconfident investors. Such investors form what they perceive to be mean-variance
efficient portfolios. But, to the extent that they overreact to signals, they fail to diversify
properly, and stocks are mispriced.
Several empirical studies based on stock market data are consistent with these views. If
prices initially overreact to information and then drift back towards rational pricing, there
will be mean reversion. This is what DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) found. In their sam-
ple, past winners end up earning negative returns, while past losers earn positive returns.
While these early studies were based on stock prices only, more recent studies endeav-
ored to take into account information and forecasts. DeBondt and Thaler (1990) study
analysts’ forecasts. Regressing actual earnings changes onto forecasted earning per shares
they rejected the hypothesis that forecasts were unbiased expectations. Their results sug-
gest that forecasts are too extreme and then tend to be corrected. This is consistent with
overreaction.
Thomas and Zhang (2008) study market reactions to earnings announcements. They con-
sider pairs of stocks in the same industry for which earnings announcements occur sequen-
1Subjects were given information and asked to predict the future grades of students. The information they were given
could be of one of three possible types: i) the previous grades of the students, ii) a measure of their mental concentration, iii)
a measure of their sense of humor. While i) was a useful signal, participants should have realized that ii) was less relevant,
and iii) practically irrelevant. And yet, participants reacted almost as strongly to ii) and iii) as to i).
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tially. Suppose earnings are announced first for stock G, and then, some time later, for H.
Since G and H are in the same industry, the first announcement is relevant for the second
stock. Consistently with this view, Thomas and Zhang (2008) find that the price of stock
H reacts to the announcement for stock G. But, if investors were rational this reaction
should be on average correct. In contradiction with this hypothesis, Thomas and Zhang
(2008) find that positive stock H reactions are followed by price declines when earnings
are announced for H. And negative reactions tend to be followed by price increases. This,
again, is consistent with overreaction.
The goal of the present paper is to complement these studies by offering direct evidence
on information signals, beliefs and financial decisions. We take advantage of a controlled
experimental setting to directly test if agents’ beliefs overreact to signals and whether
this affects performance. To achieve this, we designed a new financial decision making
experiment in which we gave signals to participants, and then elicited their forecasts and
observed their investment decisions. The experiment was run at Mannheim University in
September 2007. 104 students participated and the experiment lasted around one hour.
To strengthen the incentives of the students, we paid them according to the accuracy of
their forecasts and the performance of their financial decisions. Payment per participant
ranged between 23.38 Euro and 49.74 Euro, with an average of 37.87 Euro.
The main features of the experimental design were the following. For 20 pairs of stocks,
participants were shown price paths. For each pair of stocks, participants were told that
the two stocks were in the same industry and that the return on each stock reflected
common market shocks and common industry shocks, as well as idiosyncratic shocks. For
each pair of stocks (G and H), participants were shown the price path of stock G for the
whole year. For stock H, participants were shown the price path for the first half of the
year only. Participants were asked to forecast the price of H at the end of the year. To do
so they could use the path of G during the entire year as a signal.2
2 This task is thus similar to that analyzed by Thomas and Zhang (2008): Both their paper and ours consider pairs
of stocks; and in both studies information on G is obtained before information on H, and can thus serve as a signal to
forecast the evolution of H. The difference is that Thomas and Zhang (2008) run a field experiment while we conduct a lab
experiment. The advantage of the former approach is that observed outcomes are unquestionably economically meaningful
while the advantage of the latter is that beliefs and information can be observed more directly. It is interesting that, in the
present case, the results of both approaches are consistent with one another.
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A strong positive return on G during the second half of the year is a positive signal
for H, signalling a positive return for that stock. Rational participants should take this
into account, while bearing in mind that this signal is imperfect, since each stock also
has an idiosyncratic component. But if agents are prone to overreaction, they will react
too optimistically after positive signals, and too pessimistically after negative signals. To
test if participants overreact we study whether their forecast error is correlated with the
signals they receive. The forecast error is defined as the difference between the forecast
of the agent and the conditional expected value of the stock at the end of the year. For
each participant, we regressed across stocks this error onto the signal. While under rational
expectations the regression coefficient which we will later on refer to as Overreaction-Beta
should be 0, for the majority of participants we obtained positive estimates.
As an alternative measure of overreaction, we took the ratio of forecasting error to the
innovation in the signal. If they overreact, agents will overestimate the final price of H
after seeing good signals, and they will underestimate it after negative signals. Hence the
ratio will tend to be positive. In contrast, if agents are rational, the ratio will on average
be zero. Thus, to measure the overreaction bias of the agent, we took the median of this
ratio (Median-Overreaction-Ratio), across the 20 stocks the agents had to forecast. We
find that, on average, participants tend to overreact. We also found this second measure
of overreaction to be highly correlated with the first one.
In addition to their forecast of the price at the end of the year, participants are asked to
give an upper bound and a lower bound, such that there is only one chance out of ten that
the final price is outside these bounds. Thus, we can estimate the degree of overconfidence,
or miscalibration, of the participants. Basically, miscalibrated agents estimate confidence
intervals which are too narrow. In line with the theoretical model of Odean (1998), we
find that overconfidence and overreaction are significantly positively correlated.
We also asked the participants to form portfolios combining the stocks for which they
had to form predictions. Correlating these portfolio choices to overreaction, we can test if
this bias affects financial decisions and performance. We find that, when they overreact
more, agents allocate a greater (resp. lower) fraction of their wealth to stocks with positive
(resp. negative) signals. We also find that such over– and under–weighting reduces the
performance of the portfolios, measured by their Sharpe ratio.
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In the next section we describe our experimental design. In section 3 the results are
presented. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Theoretical Framework
In our experiment, participants observe the realization of the price of a stock. They must
use it as a signal about the price of another stock in the same industry. Denote by s˜ the
signal and by v˜ the price to be forecasted. They are such that:
s˜ = v˜ + e˜,
where v˜ and e˜ are independent. A rational forecast F (s) = E(v˜|s) must be such that
the prediction error F − v˜ is independent from the signal. Hence, for a cross section of
independent stocks j = 1, ..., N , we must have that, in the regression:
F (s˜j)− v˜j = α + βs˜j + z˜j, (1)
the two coefficients are not significantly different from 0. In contrast, if the agent overre-
acts, he / she will put too much weight on the signals. As a result β will not be equal to
0.
To gain more insights on this point in a tractable framework, assume the random variables
are jointly normal. Thus,










V ar(v˜) + V ar(e˜)
.
δ measures the reaction of the agent to the innovation in the signal. An agent who over-
reacts will overestimate δ. His biased forecast will be:
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Eˆ(v˜|s) = E(v˜) + δˆ(s− E(s˜)),
with δˆ > δ.
In this context, when observing the forecast F of an agent, we can infer if this agent is bi-
ased, and how much. In the experiment, as explained below, we know the data generating
process and can thus compute the rational forecast: Eˆ(v˜|s). We can then infer the mag-
nitude bias by subtracting the rational forecast from the observed one, and normalizing




s− E(s˜) = δˆ − δ. (2)
If the agent is rational, this ratio is equal to 0, while if the agent is prone to the overreaction
bias, the ratio will be positive.
Odean (1998) and Daniel et al. (2001) model investment decisions when investors are
overconfident in the sense that they are miscalibrated, i.e., they overestimate the precision
of their information. In our simple specification, this can be modeled as underestimating
the variance of the noise term e˜ in the signal s˜. Thus, while a rational agent correctly
estimates the variance V ar(e˜), a miscalibrated agent underestimates it and perceives the
variance to be κV ar(e˜), where κ < 1. Hence, the miscalibrated agent will form conditional
expectations using a biased coefficient to react to the signal:
δˆ =
V ar(v˜)
V ar(v˜) + κV ar(e˜)
> δ.
Thus, miscalibration generates overreaction to signals.
2.2 Simulated Price Paths
As explained below, we asked participants to process information inferred from stock
price paths. We had the choice between showing participants real stock price paths from
field data and simulated price paths. We chose the latter for two reasons. First, this
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enabled us to control the data generating process, make sure that the 20 tasks are indeed
independently and identically distributed, and compute rational expectations forecasts,
reactions to signals and confidence intervals. Second, this made the task anonymous and
minimized the risk that participants would project into the task views from their personal
experience.
To generate twenty pairs of price paths over one year, we drew for each trading day
i = 1, ..., 252 and each pair j = 1, ..., 20 three shocks: i,j (corresponding to the common
industry shock), ηGi,j (corresponding to the idiosyncratic shock of stock G) and η
H
i,j (corre-
sponding to the idiosyncratic shock of stock H). All these daily shocks are i.i.d, normally
distributed with mean 0.025 and standard deviation 2.0. We then calculated the stock
price for trading day i by adding the industry and firm specific shocks onto the stock
price of the previous day.
2.3 Questionnaires and Measurement
The questionnaire was filled out by 104 students, from two classes at the University of
Mannheim, in September 2007 (see an extract of the questionnaire in the appendix).
Participants were shown 20 pairs of stock price paths, generated as explained above. In
each pair, for one stock (G) they saw the path of daily stock prices for the whole year, while
for the other stock (H) they only saw the first six months. Two examples of such graphs
are depicted in the questionnaire in the appendix. For each pair of stocks, participants
were told that the two stocks were in the same industry and that the return on each stock
reflected common market shocks and common industry shocks, as well as idiosyncratic
shocks specific to that stock. For each pair of stocks the subjects were asked to forecast
the final price of stock H at the end of the year. In the notations we introduced above,
the final price of stock H at the end of the year corresponds to v˜, while the signal s˜
corresponds to the return on stock G over the second half of the year.
To incentivize the participants we rewarded them as a function of the accuracy of their
forecast, as explained in the questionnaire in the appendix. We were also concerned that
the participants would find the task too repetitive. To avoid this we scaled up each pair
of stocks, by multiplying the initial value and all shocks for each pair by a random num-
7
ber between 0 and 2. We also constructed each graph with great care in order to avoid
distorting effects. All graphs had the same size and look and varied only in the scaling on
the vertical axes. Since the scaling can influence the risk perception of subjects we stan-
dardized the scaling procedure using insights from Lawrence and O’Connor (1992 and
1993) and Glaser et al. (2007). The scaling on the vertical axes was chosen such that the
differences between the highest and lowest stock price over the course of twelve months
fill approximately 40% of the vertical dimension of the graph. In addition, the number of
horizontal lines is standardized to be either three or four. Also, to control for order effects
we randomized the 10 questions and distributed six different versions of the questionnaire.
We used the forecasts of the participants to measure their overreaction bias. We thus
constructed two measures of the bias for each participant.
• We refer to the first measure as the Overreaction-Beta. Consider a given participant.
In line with equation 1 we regressed, across the 20 stocks, the forecast error of the
participant onto the signal he / she observed. The regression coefficient obtained
for this participant is referred to hereafter as his / her Overreaction-Beta.3 Rational
agents will have an Overreaction-Beta equal to 0. But agents who overreact will have
positive betas.4
• We refer to the second measure as the Median-Overreaction-Ratio. Again consider
a given participant. In line with equation 2 we computed for this participant, for
each of the 20 stocks, the ratio of forecast error to the innovation in his / her signal
(Overreaction-Ratio). We then took the median across the 20 stocks and refer to the
aggregate score hereafter as the Median-Overreaction-Ratio of this agent. For rational
agents Median-Overreaction-Ratio should be 0. Agents who overreact to signals will
have a positive Median-Overreaction-Ratio.
The participants were also asked to give an upper bound and a lower bound such that
there was one only one chance out of ten that the final price would be outside the bounds.
3As we multiplied each stock price with a random number between 0 and 2 to make the task less repetitive we divide
both forecast error and signal with this random number to run the regressions with i.i.d. variables. However, our results are
robust if we simply run the regressions using forecast error and signal without adjusting for the standardization parameter.
4Our results in the following sections are essentially the same if we use the true drawn realizations instead of relying on
the parametric assumptions. Using realizations we calculate the forecasting error simply as the difference between forecast
and realization.
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One way to measure the miscalibration of the agent is to count the number of cases for
which the final price was outside the confidence interval given by the agent (see Biais
et al. (2005)). The measure we use is slightly different. It relies on the notion, well fitted
for investment contexts, that miscalibrated agents tend to underestimate risk. For each
stock, we infer from the confidence interval given by the agent the standard deviation
it implies for returns. To do this, we use the two point approximation method proposed
by Keefer and Bodily (1983). And then we divide this implied standard deviation by the
conditional standard deviation of the returns and standardize everything by multiplying
it with -1 (see e.g. Glaser and Weber (2007) and Graham and Harvey (2005)). Finally, we
take the average of this ratio across the 20 stocks to generate our Overconfidence-Person
score. The larger this score, the more overconfident the agent with extremely overconfident
subjects having a score close to zero.
After having provided their forecasts for two stocks (Gj and Gj+1) subjects were asked
to allocate an amount of 10,000 Euro between these two stocks and a risk free asset
generating a return of 0%. These kinds of portfolio allocation tasks are pretty common
in the literature (see e.g. Kroll et al. (1988) and Weber and Milliman (1997)). Subjects
were explicitly told that the two risky assets were from different industries and hence not
correlated with each other. This portfolio allocation task was carried out for ten pairs
of stocks. Short sales and borrowing were not allowed. In this portfolio allocation task,
subjects were paid according to the returns of their constructed portfolios. More precisely,
we told them that we would randomly pick one of the portfolios and calculate the return
of this portfolio. The payment for this task being then equal to 15 Euro times one plus
the return on the portfolio.
Finally, we also asked subjects questions about how they perceived themselves (see ques-
tionnaire in the appendix.) For example we asked how much they were averse to risk, how
competent they felt about statistics and how competent they felt in finance. We asked




The data was collected on September 19, 2007. One week before the data collection we
announced within the lectures Decision Analysis and Behavioral Finance that we would
perform an interesting experiment for which students could register. This registration
process was carried out to ensure that only participants with a minimum level of knowl-
edge of financial markets would participate. The study was carried through in one large
auditorium and subjects were randomly assigned a seat when entering the auditorium.
In order to avoid cheating we distributed six versions of the questionnaire that differed
in the order of the questions and instructed subjects that they would not be paid if they
would try to collude with others.
By and large, 104 students participated in the paper and pencil experiment. 56 students
were enrolled in the Behavioral Finance class, 31 in the Decision Analysis class, and 15
students attended both classes while two students did not indicate the class they were
attending. It took subjects approximately 55 minutes to finish the questionnaire.5 The
average subject was 24 years old with 83% of the subjects aged between 21 and 26. We
find an almost equal split between males and females for our Decision Analysis class and
a strong majority (76%) of males for the Behavioral Finance class. Overall, subjects in
our experiment were predominantly male 70%.
To obtain the Risk Aversion score we multiply subjects’ willingness to take risks with
-1. The average subjective Risk Aversion score was -2.9 and subjects indicated a slightly
better knowledge in statistics (2.9) than in finance (3.1). Subjects attending both classes
indicated a slightly better self-assessed knowledge in statistics (2.5) and in finance (2.7).
The overall payment for all subjects was on average 37.87 Euro with payments ranging
from 23.38 Euro to 49.74 Euro. The heterogeneity of the overall payment structure can
be seen in figure 1.
Insert figure 1 here
5Interestingly, subjects in a pre-test without payments needed only approximately 35 minutes to finish the questionnaire.
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3 Empirical Analysis
Overall, we have three main hypotheses that we want to test with our experimental setup.
First, we argue that overreaction to new signals should be prevalent in our setting. Second,
overreaction should be related to psychological biases such as miscalibration. And third,
overreaction should have some real financial consequences, i.e. we should find a relation
between overreaction and portfolio risk as well as portfolio efficiency. Our three main
blocks of hypotheses are illustrated in figure 2 and discussed more thoroughly in the
respective subsections.
Insert figure 2 here
3.1 The Level of Overreaction
The first goal of this study is to detect the degree of misreaction for each subject in our
setting. Some studies analyzing the level of misreaction find evidence for overreaction
whereas other studies find that subjects exhibit the tendency to underreact to signals
(for an overview of the diverging results in the literature see Barberis et al. (1998) and
DeBondt (2000)). Both Griffin and Tversky (1992) and Bloomfield et al. (2000) argue that
the weight of a signal, i.e. its statistical reliability, and the strength of a signal, i.e. its
magnitude, determine if subjects overreact or underreact. They reason that overreaction
should be prevalent if the signal is of high strength and low weight. In line with the
findings by Thomas and Zhang (2008) who analyze a similar setting as ours empirically
we hypothesize that subjects tend on average to overreact to information about a related
stock as the signal in our setting is of relatively high strength and low weight. Observing
overreaction in our experimental setting is also consistent with Odean (1998) who argues
that subjects tend to overweight attention-grabbing, anecdotal and graphical information,
just the type of information we gave subjects.6
Both measures of overreaction are highly correlated with each other (Spearman Rho =
0.85). Figure 3 shows that subjects tend on average to overreact in our setting no matter
6Overreaction to the graphical signal might also be interpreted as underreaction to the verbal information that was
provided to subjects.
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if we measure overreaction as Median-Overreaction-Ratio or Overreaction-Beta. For both
measures, a large majority of subjects have a positive overreaction score and exhibit the
tendency to overreact to the signal, whereas only a few subjects underreact to the signal.7
The average Median-Overreaction-Ratio is 0.33. To assess the internal psychometric con-
sistency of this overreaction measure we compute its Cronbach alpha. The Cronbach alpha
is 0.8 and thus above the threshold of 0.7 that is often assumed to indicate acceptable
psychometric reliability (see Nunnally (1978)). The beta coefficients in our regression of
forecast error onto signal are also mostly positive with an average Overreaction-Beta of
0.37. Taking a closer look at the coefficients we find 91 (2) significantly positive (negative)
coefficients and only 11 insignificant coefficients. However, there seems to be substantial
variation in the degree of both Median-Overreaction-Ratio and Overreaction-Ratio with
the scores ranging from -0.67 to 0.76. In the following subsections, we want to analyze
whether these individual differences in overreaction are systematically related with other
traits like overconfidence and performance.
Insert figure 3 here
3.2 Miscalibration Determining the Level of Overreaction
Before we can test whether more miscalibrated subjects overreact more strongly we have
to show that we have a substantial degree of overconfidence in our experimental setting.
Hence, we calculate Overconfidence for each stock using the two point approximation
method proposed by Keefer and Bodily (1983) and aggregate these scores for each sub-
ject to obtain Overconfidence-Person.8 We find substantial degrees of overconfidence in
our setting with 76 subjects having an Overconfidence-Person score above -1 and a me-
dian Overconfidence-Person score of -0.71 roughly the same size DeBondt (1998) finds on
average in his analysis of Fox Valley investors. A Wilcoxon signed rank test indicates that
Overconfidence-Person is significantly larger than -1 suggesting a prevalence of overcon-
fidence in our sample. Moreover, in line with Glaser et al. (2005) we also find substantial
7We obtain very similar results if we aggregate Median-Overreaction-Ratio using the mean instead of the median.
Moreover, there are no substantial differences if we run our analyses for questions with a positive and negative signal
separately.
8Testing the internal reliability of our overconfidence score we find a Cronbach alpha above 0.9.
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heterogeneity in the degree of overconfidence in our sample as the Overconfidence-Person
scores range from -2.2 for the most underconfident subjects to -0.11 for the most overcon-
fident ones.9
If the hypothesis that more overconfident subjects tend to overreact more strongly,
since they overweight the informativeness of the signal, holds (see e.g. Odean (1998)
and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001)) we should find a significantly positive relation between
Overconfidence-Person and both of our overreaction measures. The relation should be pos-
itive since a higher Overconfidence-Person score indicates higher levels of overconfidence.
Figure 4 illustrates the relation between both overreaction measures and Overconfidence-
Person. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between Overconfidence-Person and
both overreaction measures is significantly positive (Rho = 0.24 at a significance level of
0.02 for Median-Overreaction-Ratio and Rho = 0.31 at a significance level of less than
0.01 for Overreaction-Beta). Moreover, our results for this relationship are stable if we
control for demographic aspects and self-assessed knowledge or risk aversion. Thus, we
can confirm our hypothesis that more overconfident subjects overreact more strongly.
Insert figure 4 here
3.3 Economic Significance of Overreaction
Our findings imply that subjects in our experiment overreact on average to signals and
that there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of overreaction. We also show a
positive relation between overconfidence scores and overreaction indicating that more
overconfident subjects tend to overreact more strongly. Besides analyzing the degree of
overreaction and its relation to psychological biases we want to analyze the financial
consequences of overreaction. Financial consequences of overreaction are in the literature
argued to be twofold. Fischer and Verrecchia (1999) and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) argue
that subjects who overreact are - owing to overconfidence - willing to take more risks in
their investments to exploit mispricings. Daniel et al. (2001) and Biais and Weber (2007)
9We also calculated for each person the number of questions for which the conditional expected value or the realized
value were between the stated upper and lower bounds. The correlation between these two new overconfidence measures
and our measure calculated from implied standard deviations was above 0.9. In addition, results in the following sections
were essentially the same if we use these two other measures in the further calculations.
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show that subjects who overreact fail to diversify properly and hold less efficient portfolios
than subjects who do not overreact.
3.3.1 The Effect of Overreaction on Risk Taking
The main goal of this section is to analyze whether overreaction has an influence on the
riskiness of portfolio decisions. As we did not allow subjects to take short positions in
any asset we should observe a twofold effect of overreaction on risk taking. After a good
signal overreacting subjects overweight the positive effects of the signal and invest more
heavily in the risky asset whereas after a bad signal they overweight the negative effects
of the signal and invest less heavily into the risky asset.10 Before we test this relationship
on a disaggregate level, we want to test if it also holds on an aggregate level. Therefore,
we correlate each subject’s median portfolio risk which equals his / her median portfolio
volatility with both overreaction measures. However, since our hypothesis depends on the
sign of the signal we do this analysis separately for questions for which subjects received
positive (Median Risk+) and negative (Median Risk−) signals. Our hypothesis is that we
should find a significantly positive correlation between both constructs for good signals
and a significantly negative correlation for bad signals.
Indeed, for portfolios with a positive signal the Spearman rank correlation of Median
Risk+ with Median-Overreaction-Ratio is 0.28 (p-value < 0.01) and the correlation with
Overreaction-Beta is 0.24 (p-value = 0.01). For portfolios with a negative signal the Spear-
man rank correlation of Median Risk− with Median-Overreaction-Ratio is -0.21 (p-value
= 0.03) and the correlation with Overreaction-Beta is -0.28 (p-value < 0.01).11 These
relations are illustrated in figure 5 and figure 6.
Insert figure 5 here
Insert figure 6 here
10If we would have allowed short sales more overreacting subjects should have taken larger short positions in stocks with
a negative signal than rational subjects.
11If we exclude subjects that decide not to invest into any of the risky assets, i.e. subjects whose portfolio risk is zero,
our results weaken as we lose a substantial number of observations. The correlation coefficients are still negative, however,
not statistically significant.
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An important issue in this context is if our results that a higher level of overreaction leads
subjects to take more risks after good signals and less risks after bad signals are driven by
other factors such as risk attitudes, gender, cultural background or overconfidence. Risk
attitudes are the most prominent factor for which we want to control for in the following.
In risk-return frameworks commonly used in the finance literature (see e.g. Markowitz
(1952)) risk taking is governed by the risk and the return of an investment and by a
subject’s risk attitude. Hence, the more risk averse a subject is the less risk he / she
will take. Various studies also argue that there is a gender effect in risk taking and that
females take substantially less risks than men in investment decisions (for an overview of
the literature see Eckel and Grossman (2008)).
Moreover, we want to analyze whether the cultural background of subjects could influence
the risk taking behavior. In line with Weber and Hsee (1998) we argue that German
subjects who are from a more individualistic society should invest into less risky portfolios
than subjects from more collectivist societies.12 Furthermore, our data allows us to test
an assumption common in various models on overconfidence (see e.g. Odean (1998) and
Daniel et al. (2001)) that more overconfident subjects are going to take more risks. In
addition to these factors, we will also control for the age of the subjects, the course they
are enrolled, their semester, and their self assessed knowledge in finance and in statistics.
Table 1 documents that both Median-Overreaction-Ratio and Overreaction-Beta are sig-
nificantly related to Median Risk+ and Median Risk− even if we control for additional
factors. Regressions in columns 1 - 4 analyze portfolios for which subjects receive a pos-
itive signal. For these portfolios we find that an in increase in the overreaction score by
one results in a 5.4 to 7.0 percentage points increase of Median Risk+ no matter if we
control for overconfidence in the regression (columns 2 and 4) or not. Since Median Risk+
is on average 0.22 this implies that the effect of both overreaction scores on portfolio risk
12Hsee and Weber (1999) and Weber and Hsee (1998) find significant cross-cultural differences in risk taking. More
specifically, they argue that subjects who live in a more collectivist society like China take substantially more risks than
subjects who live in a more individualistic society such as the USA. They term this the “cushion-hypothesis”. The line of
reasoning is that subjects from less individualistic societies can rely on their family, i.e. have a cushion, to help them in case
of need. Since we collected data on the native-language of the subjects we are able to test this cultural hypothesis. As only
29 out of 104 subjects are not Germans we generate a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the subject is a native
speaker in German and 0 otherwise. The average individualism score according to Hofstede (1980) in the Non-German
group which consists of Russian, Chinese, Bulgarian, and French subjects is 36.7 and thus lower than the one for Germans
which is 67. Hence, Germans who are part of a more individualistic society should invest into less risky portfolios.
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is also of high economic significance. Analyzing portfolios for which subjects receive a
negative signal (see regressions 5 & 6) we find, consistent with the bivariate analyses, a
negative effect indicating that more overreacting subjects take substantially less risks in
these scenarios.
Moreover, for those questions for which subjects received a positive signal our control
variables indicate additional statistically significant effects. First, Median Risk+ of males
is approximately 4 percentage points higher than the one of females. This result is in line
with findings in Donkers et al. (2001) and Dohmen et al. (2005) who show that males
take substantially more risks in their financial decisions. As hypothesized we also find
a significant negative effect of Risk Aversion on Median Risk+. Thus, less risk averse
subjects are investing into riskier portfolios. In addition, we also find weak support for
cultural differences (see Bontempo et al. (1997) and Weber and Hsee (1998)) as German
subjects hold less risky portfolios than Non-Germans. However, this effect is only weakly
significant and vanishes if we control for overconfidence. However, we cannot observe these
effects for Median Risk− in columns 5 & 6. This difference between questions for which
subjects received a positive or a negative signal could be analyzed more thoroughly in
future research. Furthermore, in line with Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Menkhoff et al.
(2006) we do not find a direct effect of overconfidence on portfolio risk but only an indirect
effect of overconfidence on risk taking mediated by overreaction.
Insert table 1 here
Now that we have found evidence for the hypothesized relationship between overreaction
and portfolio risk on the aggregate level, we turn to analyze the relationship on a disag-
gregate level. Hence, we re-run the regressions from table 1, but instead of using aggregate
scores for each subject we run our regressions for each question individually controlling
for question fixed effects using dummies. As Overreaction-Beta is an aggregate measure
that is constant for each person over all questions we use in the following disaggregated
analyses only Overreaction-Ratio.13 To account for non-independent residuals within sub-
jects we cluster our observations over subjects. A first look at the results in table 2 reveals
13To get a single score for the two variables Overreaction-Ratio and Overconfidence that are calculated for each stock,
i.e. twice for every portfolio allocation question, we simply take the mean of the variables for each portfolio allocation task.
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that the results are mainly consistent with our previous findings in table 1. Higher levels
of overreaction result in riskier portfolio investments after positive signals and less risky
portfolio investments after negative signals. The effect of Overreaction-Ratio on Risk+
and Risk− is highly significant regardless whether we control for overconfidence or not.
In addition, we find that after having observed a positive signal men hold substantially
more risky portfolios than women, and more risk averse subjects invest into less risky po-
sitions. We also find support for the cultural hypothesis as the dummy variable German
is significantly negative. Once again, the additional effects of Gender and German cannot
be observed for portfolios for which subjects received a negative signal.14
Insert table 2 here
3.3.2 The Effect of Overreaction on Portfolio Efficiency
A further consequence of overreaction that we want to test in the following is the rela-
tionship between overreaction and portfolio performance. Biais and Weber (2007) show in
their theoretical model that subjects who overreact, i.e. put too much weight on private
signals, will have a lower investment performance. Hence, in our experimental setting we
expect to observe that subjects will hold less efficient portfolios the more they overreact.
However, we found a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the level of overreaction with
some subjects even underreacting and thus putting not enough weight on the signal (see
subsection 3.1. We argue that these underreacting subjects should also invest into less
efficient portfolios than rational subjects. This should result in a hump-shaped relation
between overreaction and portfolio efficiency with rational subjects having the highest
efficiency and efficiency decreasing with higher levels of misreaction.
To analyze this relationship in more detail we first have to define the term efficiency
of a portfolio. Our measure of portfolio efficiency is the ex-ante Sharpe-Ratio for each
14Instead of clustering over subjects to control for non-independent residuals we also re-run the regressions using fixed
and random effects models. We obtain essentially the same results using these models. However, both models have their
disadvantages. A Hausman test shows that the random effects model needs not to generate consistent estimates. Although,
the fixed effects model generates consistent estimates its major disadvantage is that we cannot make a statement about the
effect of demographics, risk attitude, and knowledge on risk taking. Hence, we only make use of clustered ordinary least
squares regressions where we control for question specific effects.
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subject and each portfolio. To calculate the Sharpe-Ratio for a subject’s portfolio we use
conditional expected returns and conditional expected standard deviation. Calculating the
Sharpe-Ratio makes only sense for stocks with a positive conditional expected return, and
thus we exclude in the following analyses all stocks with a negative conditional expected
return.
In addition, as we imposed short selling constraints on our subjects, i.e. we did not allow
them to short sell assets in order to invest more into the other assets, the capital market
line is no straight-line. Thus, we cannot make the general statement that a higher Sharpe-
Ratio implies a more efficient portfolio as it is possible that subjects that want to take
more risks can only do so by investing a relatively large amount into the riskier stock.
Due to the short selling constraint portfolios of these subjects have a lower Sharpe ratio
than portfolios of subjects that invest into the market portfolio. But we cannot infer that
they are less efficient as they offer the only possibility to take on more risk. However,
for subjects that invest in portfolios that are less risky than the market portfolio and for
subjects that invest into the risk free asset the risk constraint is not binding. Hence, in
our further analyses we omit 152 out of 728 portfolios that are to the right of the market
portfolio, i.e. that are riskier than the market portfolio, and for which subjects did not
invest into the risk free asset. Therefore, in the following analyses we only take portfolios
for which the short selling constraint is not binding.
To document the link between overreaction and portfolio efficiency we calculate Spearman
rank correlation coefficients between portfolio efficiency and Median-Overreaction-Ratio
and Overreaction-Beta, respectively. However, as our hypothesis implies that stronger
misreaction (overreaction or underreaction) leads to less efficient portfolios we divide our
sample into two unbalanced parts. One part is composed of subjects that overreact and the
other, substantially smaller one of subjects that underreact. Calculating Spearman rank
correlation coefficients for the two parts separately we find a negative relation for subjects
that overreact with coefficients of -0.33 for Median-Overreaction-Ratio (p− value < 0.01)
and -0.18 for Overreaction-Beta (p − value = 0.07) and a tentatively positive effect for
the six subjects that underreact. This relation is illustrated by the dashed (dotted) lines
in figure 7 for subjects that overreact (underreact). The figure demonstrates that a higher
level of over/underreaction gives rise to less efficient portfolios.
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Insert figure 7 here
While the above evidence indicates an effect of overreaction on portfolio efficiency we want
to analyze whether this effect is stable if we control for additional variables. To analyze
this in more detail we run regressions with the median Sharpe ratio (see table 3) and the
disaggregated Sharpe ratio (see table 4) as dependent variables. Table 3 documents the
relation between portfolio efficiency and both overreaction measures on an aggregate level
using additional controls for all observations for which subjects overreact. Consistent with
our previous findings both overreaction measures have a significantly negative coefficient
indicating that higher levels of overreaction lead to lower levels of portfolio efficiency.15
Insert table 3 here
In addition, we re-run our regressions on a single question level instead of an aggregate
level and account for non-independent residuals within subjects by clustering over sub-
jects. Again, we only make use of Overreaction-Ratio as Overreaction-Beta is constant
for all subjects. Additionally, we control for question effects using dummy variables. The
results of these regressions are illustrated in table 4. In regressions 1 & 2 we only take
observations for which Overreaction-Ratio is greater than zero indicating overreaction
whereas in regressions 3 & 4 we only take observations for which Overreaction-Ratio is
below zero indicating underreaction.
The regressions in table 4 show the twofold effect of overreaction on portfolio efficiency
on a single stock level. The more subjects misreact the lower is their portfolio efficiency.
On the one hand, we find highly significantly negative overreaction coefficients of approx-
imately -0.145 in the first two regressions no matter if we control for overconfidence or
not. On the other hand, our results in regressions 3 & 4 indicate a highly negative effect of
underreaction of approximately -0.3 on portfolio efficiency. Consistent with Daniel et al.
(2001) and Biais and Weber (2007) we show that misreaction to signals, i.e. overreaction
or underreaction, is costly for investors and harms their performance. Minimizing the level
of misreaction can have a substantial effect on a subjects portfolio efficiency as measured
15Regressing the median Sharpe ratio of subjects’ portfolios on various control variables for underreacting subjects only is
not reasonable as the number of underreacting subjects is six and four, respectively, and thus too low to make any inferences
about the relationship between overreaction and portfolio efficiency while controlling for additional variables.
19
with the Sharpe-Ratio. Interestingly, the coefficient of Overreaction-Ratio on portfolio ef-
ficiency is in absolute terms much larger if we analyze underreaction than if we analyze
overreaction. Future research might want to analyze this difference in more depth. Overall,
our findings are in line with the hypothesis of a hump-shaped relation between portfolio
efficiency and overreaction. Hence, the closer subjects are to the rational benchmark the
more efficient the portfolios are they are investing.16
Moreover, for regressions 1 & 2 we find a significant effect for the course subjects are
enrolled. Subjects that are enrolled in the Decision Analysis class which is a more general
topic course not only for students specializing in finance tend to invest into worse per-
forming portfolios than subjects that are enrolled in the Behavioral Finance class which
is part of the specialization in finance. This is indicated by the positive coefficients of
Behavioral Finance and Both. Mahani and Poteshman (2008) provide similar evidence
by showing that unsophisticated option market investors overreact to news on underly-
ing stock and consequently have a lower performance. Further control variables are not
strongly significant, just as in the regressions on the aggregate level.
Insert table 4 here
4 Conclusion
This paper experimentally analyzes the existence of overreaction, its relation to psycholog-
ical biases, and its financial consequences. We introduce a new experimental design that
asks subjects to estimate the future price of an asset given the information on another,
related asset. This design allows us to measure the level of overreaction explicitly. We mea-
sure overreaction using two highly correlated measures: Our first measure of overreaction
is simply the ratio of forecasting error to innovation in the signal (Overreaction-Ratio)
and our second measure of overreaction is the slope of a regression of error onto signal
(Overreaction-Beta). Overall, we find evidence for strong overreaction in our data which
is consistent with findings in Thomas and Zhang (2008) who analyze a similar scenario
16As in section 3.3.2 we re-run the regressions using fixed and random effects models. We obtain essentially the same
results using these models. However, a Hausman test shows that the random effects model needs not to generate consistent
estimates and thus we abstain from using it.
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empirically. However, there seems to be large heterogeneity in the level of overreaction as
few subjects are even prone to underreaction.
Examining the relationship between overreaction and psychological biases we focus on
overconfidence and more exactly on miscalibration. We document a substantial level of
overconfidence with the majority of subjects being overconfident but also a few subjects
being underconfident. Relating overconfidence to overreaction we find, as hypothesized,
that more overconfident subjects tend to overreact more heavily.
Moreover, we analyze the effect of overreaction on subjects’ portfolio risk and on their
portfolio efficiency. We show that after having received a positive signal overreacting
subjects take substantially more risks than rational subjects. In addition, our results
support findings in the literature that show an effect of gender (see Eckel and Grossman
(2008)), risk aversion (see Barsky et al. (1997)), and culture (see Weber and Hsee (1998))
on risk taking. Also in line with our hypothesis we show that after receiving a negative
signal overreacting subjects invest into substantially less risky portfolios. This effect can
be attributed to the short selling constraint which was imposed by us to make the task
more realistic and less complex.
Relating portfolio efficiency to overreaction we find no linear relation but more of a hump-
shaped relation. This hump-shape implies that portfolio efficiency is lower the more a
subject overreacts or underreacts. Analyzing the effect of overreaction and underreaction
separately we find exactly this effect. Moreover, our results rely on decisions that have
substantial monetary effects. We pay subjects an hourly compensation that is on average
five times as high as the hourly wage of undergraduate research assistants.
Our experimental approach offers the advantage that we can explicitly measure the level of
overreaction and relate it to psychological biases and financial consequences. In a similar
experiment that was run with professional bond traders we used price paths from real
assets instead of artificial ones. The results are robust and show that even professional
bond traders tend to overreact to these kind of signals.
Future research could utilize our experimental approach and analyze whether other psy-
chological traits such as the use of the representativeness heuristic (see Barberis et al.
(1998)) or the hindsight bias (see Biais and Weber (2007)) influence subjects’ information
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processing, i.e. their level of overreaction, and subsequently their investment behavior. It
could also be of interest to analyze whether other forms of overconfidence like the better
than average effect or illusion of control are related to overreaction and correspondingly
to investment behavior in this context. Moreover, future research could study in an ex-
perimental market setting whether markets populated with agents who overreact more
strongly will yield different price patterns or even less efficient prices. Another promising
direction, in the spirit of Griffin and Tversky (1992) and Bloomfield et al. (2000), would
be to study whether the level of overreaction varies depending on the weight of the signal
subjects receive. Higher weight levels and subsequently lower levels of overreaction should
be observed if the industry specific shock is of higher weight than the firm specific shock,
i.e. if the two stocks in one graph are more highly correlated. In a similar vein, it would
also be interesting to analyze how the level of overreaction changes if the time periods for
which subjects receive graphical information are varied. Finally, it would be interesting
to analyze whether subjects that overreact in our experimental setting and consequently
have less efficient portfolios will also tend to invest into less efficient portfolios in reality.
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Table 1: Median risk regressions
This table presents results on the relation between a subject’s median portfolio risk (the median portfolio
risk for portfolios for which subjects received a positive signal is indicated by + and the median portfolio
risk for portfolios for which subjects received a negative signal is indicated by −) and Age, Gender (the
dummy variable takes the value 1 if the subject is male), Decision Analysis, Behavioral Finance, and Both
(the dummy variables take the value 1 if the subject attends the respective class), Semesters, German (the
dummy variable takes the value 1 if a subject’s mother language is German), Risk Aversion (the variable
is defined on a scale from -1 = highly risk averse to -5 = not risk averse at all), Statistical Knowledge and
Financial Knowledge (both variables are defined on a scale from 1 = very high knowledge to 5 = very low
knowledge), Median-Overreaction-Ratio, Overreaction-Beta, and Overconfidence-Person using ordinary least
squares regressions with heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. We report regression coefficients and
p-values in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Med. Risk+ Med. Risk+ Med. Risk+ Med. Risk+ Med. Risk− Med. Risk−
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.830) (0.820) (0.568) (0.580) (0.791) (0.640)
Gender 0.040 0.040 0.042 0.042 -0.012 -0.013
(0.023)** (0.021)** (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.352) (0.308)
Behavioral Finance -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.009 0.023 0.022
(0.234) (0.339) (0.373) (0.490) (0.042)** (0.058)*
Both -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 0.017 0.019
(0.643) (0.854) (0.722) (0.933) (0.235) (0.199)
Semesters 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.696) (0.603) (0.516) (0.453) (0.821) (0.954)
German -0.026 -0.024 -0.027 -0.025 0.001 0.002
(0.086)* (0.116) (0.075)* (0.104) (0.924) (0.860)
Risk Aversion -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.010 -0.010
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.120) (0.126)
Statistical Knowledge -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 0.008 0.006
(0.242) (0.329) (0.229) (0.311) (0.306) (0.363)
Financial Knowledge 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.004
(0.404) (0.460) (0.477) (0.528) (0.687) (0.583)
Median-Overreaction-Ratio 0.070 0.064 -0.037
(0.010)*** (0.020)** (0.089)*
Overreaction-Beta 0.061 0.054 -0.067
(0.030)** (0.059)* (0.002)***
Overconfidence-Person 0.012 0.013 0.006 0.010
(0.433) (0.407) (0.659) (0.459)
Constant 0.152 0.157 0.155 0.161 -0.021 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.669) (0.937)
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101
R-squared 0.257 0.263 0.243 0.250 0.129 0.175
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Table 2: Risk regressions
This table presents results on the relation between the risk of a portfolio (the risk for portfolios for which
subjects received a positive signal is indicated by + and the risk for portfolios for which subjects received
a negative signal is indicated by −) and Age, Gender (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the subject
is male), Decision Analysis, Behavioral Finance, and Both (the dummy variables take the value 1 if the
subject attends the respective class), Semesters, German (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if a subject’s
mother language is German), Risk Aversion (the variable is defined on a scale from -1 = highly risk averse
to -5 = not risk averse at all), Statistical Knowledge and Financial Knowledge (both variables are defined
on a scale from 1 = very high knowledge to 5 = very low knowledge), Overreaction-Ratio, Overreaction-
Beta, and Overconfidence using clustered least squares regressions (number of clusters is equal to 101). We
report regression coefficients and p-values in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Risk+ Risk+ Risk− Risk−
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.563) (0.551) (0.605) (0.619)
Gender 0.049 0.048 -0.007 -0.008
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.473) (0.423)
Behavioral Finance -0.013 -0.010 0.015 0.016
(0.334) (0.452) (0.088)* (0.060)*
Both -0.002 0.003 0.015 0.018
(0.918) (0.877) (0.244) (0.160)
Semesters 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.631) (0.524) (0.625) (0.757)
German -0.029 -0.027 -0.001 0.001
(0.040)** (0.054)* (0.919) (0.903)
Risk Aversion -0.021 -0.021 -0.008 -0.008
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.080)* (0.082)*
Statistical Knowledge -0.008 -0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.287) (0.416) (0.332) (0.248)
Financial Knowledge 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005
(0.703) (0.781) (0.275) (0.334)
Overreaction-Ratio 0.035 0.033 -0.052 -0.054
(0.008)*** (0.010)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Overconfidence 0.015 0.009
(0.278) (0.206)
Constant 0.139 0.143 0.005 0.009
(0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.893) (0.819)
Observations 705 705 303 303
R-squared 0.472 0.474 0.214 0.220
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Table 3: Median Sharpe ratio regressions
This table presents results on the relation between a subject’s median portfolio efficiency measured with
the Sharpe ratio and Age, Gender (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the subject is male), Decision
Analysis, Behavioral Finance, and Both (the dummy variables take the value 1 if the subject attends the
respective class), Semesters, German (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if a subject’s mother language
is German), Risk Aversion (the variable is defined on a scale from -1 = highly risk averse to -5 = not risk
averse at all), Statistical Knowledge and Financial Knowledge (both variables are defined on a scale from
1 = very high knowledge to 5 = very low knowledge), Median-Overreaction-Ratio, Overreaction-Beta, and
Overconfidence-Person using ordinary least squares regressions with heteroscedasticity consistent standard
errors. Both regressions are only run for subjects for which the respective overreaction score was greater
than zero indicating overreaction. We report regression coefficients and p-values in parentheses. * indicates















Risk Aversion 0.060 0.059
(0.137) (0.170)
Statistical Knowledge -0.040 -0.027
(0.373) (0.566)













Table 4: Sharpe ratio regressions
This table presents results on the relation between the efficiency of a portfolio measured as the Sharpe-Ratio
and Age, Gender (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the subject is male), Decision Analysis, Behavioral
Finance, and Both (the dummy variables take the value 1 if the subject attends the respective class), Semesters,
German (the dummy variable takes the value 1 if a subject’s mother language is German), Risk Aversion
(the variable is defined on a scale from -1 = highly risk averse to -5 = not risk averse at all), Statistical
Knowledge and Financial Knowledge (both variables are defined on a scale from 1 = very high knowledge
to 5 = very low knowledge), Overreaction-Ratio, Overreaction-Beta, and Overconfidence using clustered least
squares regressions (number of clusters is equal to 101). Regression 1 & 2 are run using only observations for
which the respective overreaction score indicates overreaction: we indicate this by SharpeOR>0. For regression
3 & 4 we use only observations for which we find negative overreaction, i.e. underreaction and indicate this
with SharpeOR<0. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and ***
indicates significance at the 1% level.
SharpeOR>0 SharpeOR>0 SharpeOR<0 SharpeOR<0
Age 0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.435) (0.343) (0.506) (0.448)
Gender -0.067 -0.067 0.129 0.136
(0.055)* (0.057)* (0.122) (0.094)*
Behavioral Finance 0.090 0.082 0.015 0.005
(0.025)** (0.038)** (0.793) (0.922)
Both 0.113 0.093 0.023 0.008
(0.018)** (0.045)** (0.800) (0.939)
Semesters -0.009 -0.010 -0.012 -0.014
(0.247) (0.174) (0.334) (0.275)
German 0.037 0.028 -0.109 -0.115
(0.358) (0.501) (0.165) (0.131)
Risk Aversion 0.032 0.030 -0.024 -0.023
(0.104) (0.112) (0.416) (0.442)
Statistical Knowledge -0.025 -0.031 0.053 0.048
(0.212) (0.114) (0.105) (0.151)
Financial Knowledge -0.021 -0.018 -0.048 -0.047
(0.248) (0.329) (0.095)* (0.102)
Overreaction-Ratio -0.145 -0.142 0.297 0.308
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)***
Overconfidence -0.052 -0.041
(0.059)* (0.409)
Constant 1.994 1.963 1.982 1.980
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 421 421 137 137
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we would like to welcome you to this questionnaire study which is a joint research project of the Univer-
sity of Mannheim and Toulouse University. The study is sponsored by the European Union within the 
„European Network for the Advancement of Behavioural Economics“ (ENABLE). The main part of the 
study consists of 10 questions that should be answered sequentially. Each of the 10 questions is made up 
of two parts, part A and part B. Within part A we kindly ask you to submit your stock price forecasts for 
two stocks by stating a lower bound, a best estimate, and an upper bound. Part B asks you to construct 
your preferred portfolio, choosing between two stocks and a risk free asset. In addition to these ten ques-
tions we are going to ask you several shorter questions where you have to indicate how you see yourself 
and your colleagues, respectively. 
As a thank you for taking part in our survey, we are paying you a performance-related participation com-
pensation. This compensation depends only upon your performance in the two parts A and B of the ques-
tionnaire. How your compensation is determined exactly is going to be explained in the instructions to 
this study, following on the next pages. 
As researchers we heavily rely on the quality of our collected data. Thus, we would kindly ask you to take 
your time filling out this questionnaire and not to communicate with other participants of the study.  
Thank you very much for your assistance and enjoy the questionnaire.  
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Part A: Stock Price Forecasts - Instructions
We are interested in the question how financial markets really work. Therefore, we need to understand 
how you form expectations about future stock prices. In part A you will see stock price charts, each with 
two stocks. 
The two stocks shown in each graph are from the same industry and hence positively correlated. More 
precisely, future stock price changes are random and depend upon a common industry-specific shock and 
a stock-specific shock. The magnitude of the two shocks is on average equal and the shocks have the 
same statistical distribution. In addition, we know that these distributions in the first 6 months are iden-
tical to the distributions in the following 6 months, i.e. the distributions remain constant. 
For one stock (Stock G-0) we are going to show you the stock price chart for all 12 months whereas for 


























We kindly ask you to forecast the stock price of Stock H-0 in 6 months, i.e. at t = 12. The only informa-
tion given to you is the stock price performance of Stock H-0 for the first 6 months and the stock price 
performance of Stock G-0 for the whole observation period. In part A you are asked to make three state-
ments concerning the future stock price: a lower bound, a best guess, and an upper bound.
? The best guess should be equal to the value where you expect the price of Stock H-0 to be in 6 months 
(i.e. at time t = 12) 
? You should set the bounds such that only in 1 out of 10 questions the actually realized stock price is 
outside your provided bounds. Hence, you should provide an upper and a lower bound such that you 
are 90% sure that the realized value of Stock H-0 at time t = 12 falls between the two 
2
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Part A: Stock Price Forecasts – Payment Scheme
Your payment in part A depends only on the quality of your best guesses. I.e. the smaller the difference 
between your best guess and the actually realized stock price is, the higher is your payment going to be. 
To determine your payment exactly we calculate for each of the 20 exercises (10 questions each with 2 
exercises) in part A your so called error. This error is the absolute margin between your best guess and 
the actually realized stock price:  
  Error i = | Best Guess i – Actually Realied Price i |    i = 1, 2, …, 20 
Then we calculate your average error over all 20 exercises in part A as: 







Your final payment for part A is the maximum of 0 € and 50 € minus your average error and is calculated 
using the following formula: 
? ?ErrorAverage -  € 50;€ 0 Max  PaymentA ?
Thus, in a best case scenario your payment in part A can be up to 50 € and in the worst case your payment 
is going to be 0 €. 
Part B: Portfolio Allocation - Instructions
In every of the 10 portfolio allocation questions in part B we kindly ask you to invest at time t = 6 a given 
amount of 10,000 €. Your investment opportunities in every question include a risk free asset that gener-
ates a return of 0% and two risky stocks. The two stocks in part B are the same stocks for which you pro-
vided stock price estimates in part A of the respective question. 
You are asked to allocate the amount of 10,000 € – from your point of view – optimally between the risk 
free asset and the two stocks. However, you can only invest amounts greater or equal to zero into each 
of the three assets. I.e. you cannot sell one asset short and invest a higher amount of money into the re-
maining two assets. Moreover, you are only offered these three investment opportunities and hence you 
must divide the whole amount of 10,000 € between them. 
Part B: Portfolio Allocation - Payment Scheme
At the end of the study we are going to calculate realized returns for each stock for the time period t = 6 
to t = 12. Then we are going to pick 1 of the 10 questions randomly and are going to calculate the real-
ized return of your stated portfolio. 
Your final payment for part B is equal to: 
  Payment 
B

































Question 3.B: Portfolio Allocation 
 
In the following situation we kindly ask you to divide 10,000 € at time t = 6 between the following three 
investment opportunities: Stock H-5, Stock H-6 and a risk free asset, that generates a return of 0 %. The 





Best guess for stock H-5 Upper bound for stock H-5 
€ € 
Lower bound for stock H-5 
€ 
Best guess for stock H-6 Upper bound for stock H-6 
€ € 

















































Amount invested in Stock H-6 
€ 
Amount invested in Stock H-5 
€ 
The three amounts should add up to 10,000 € 
Amount invested in risk free asset 
€ 
40
Some questions about how you see yourself:
How do you rate your statistical knowledge? 
1       2            3    4       5 
very good bad
How do you rate your knowledge about stock markets and financial markets? 
1      2           3   4       5 
very good bad
In this questionnaire, we asked you to provide upper and lower bounds for 20 exercises related to stock 
price expectations (part A). For how many of these exercises do you think the final value is outside the 
range you gave? 
________ (Please give a number between 0 and 20)
In this questionnaire, we asked all subjects to provide upper and lower bounds for 20 exercises related to 
stock price expectations (part A). For how many of these exercises do you think the final value is outside 
the range provided by the average participant? 
________ (Please give a number between 0 and 20)
Some final questions about you:
Age: __________ 
Gender:        female    male 
Line of studies: ________________________________ 
Semester: ____________________ 
How would you classify your willingness to take risks in financial decisions? 
1      2           3   4       5 
Very low 
willingness 
Very high 
willingness 
5
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